Articles categorized as:  Pandemic/Infectious Diseases index

Dr. Peter M. Sandman
Pandemic Flu and
Other Infectious Diseases Index

Until 2003 my risk communication work only occasionally dealt with infectious disease outbreaks. Even when I got involved in the U.S. government’s response to the anthrax attacks and the possible threat of a smallpox attack, I saw myself as working on terrorism crisis communication, not infectious disease communication.

Then came SARS. Working jointly with my wife, physician Jody Lanard, I started helping the World Health Organization think through its communication efforts on SARS. Pretty soon Jody and I were writing about how various countries, especially Singapore and Canada, had handled their SARS outbreaks. By the time avian influenza caught my attention in January 2004, infectious disease outbreaks were one of my things. In the next couple of years, I had a chance to advise clients or write columns on a polio inoculation program, a hemorrhagic fever outbreak, a flu vaccine shortage, and the effort to “recall” a laboratory test kit that contained a potentially pandemic strain of influenza.

When Jody and I wrote our first pandemic flu column in December 2004, many experts thought a bird flu (H5N1) pandemic might well be impending and might well be catastrophically severe. Between 2005 and 2007 I added a lot of bird flu risk communication writing to this website … and to keep it all organized I added this “Pandemic Flu and Other Infectious Diseases Index.”

As of mid-2010, bird flu still hasn’t gone pandemic. It still could. But in the meantime, we got the swine flu (H1N1) pandemic of 2009–2010, which aroused a lot of justifiable concern and then turned out anticlimactically mild.

Even apart from influenza pandemics, a lot of experts think infectious diseases are likely to be a big issue – and a big risk communication challenge – in the coming decades. We have brand new emerging diseases like SARS and Ebola, re-emerging diseases like antibiotic-resistant tuberculosis, and tropical diseases like dengue and malaria that are starting to spread to temperate countries (perhaps thanks to global warming).

There’s another reason for a separate index. Pandemics and other infectious disease outbreaks don’t squeeze easily into my categories of crisis communication, precaution advocacy, and outrage management.

  • Beforehand, the main task is precaution advocacy: trying to arouse concern and motivate preparedness even though there’s nothing bad on the immediate horizon.
  • When a serious disease outbreak looks potentially imminent, wise risk communicators segue into pre-crisis communication, an amalgam of precaution advocacy and crisis communication. The trick is to get people ready for something that might be really bad, while simultaneously reminding them that it might also be no big deal.
  • In the middle of a serious disease outbreak, the job is mostly crisis communication: helping people bear the outbreak and guiding them through it. But there’s also a lot of precaution advocacy aimed at the segment of the public that isn’t upset enough yet. And there’s a lot of outrage management, aimed at those who are excessively upset, upset about the “wrong” things, or appropriately upset about certain aspects of outbreak response (delayed or misleading information; overpromised and under-delivered protective measures; etc.).
  • Afterwards, outrage management is the key. If the outbreak was severe, the outrage focuses on why officials didn’t prepare better and warn us more. If the outbreak was mild, the outrage focuses on why officials wasted money over-preparing, hyped the risk, and provoked unnecessary worry. Precaution advocacy regarding the next outbreak should also accompany the public post-mortem on the last one, though it often doesn’t.

For the most part I haven’t included bioterrorism articles in this index – my writing on the anthrax attacks, for example, can be found in the crisis communication index but not here. But I made some exceptions; I included my column on the risk of H2N2 terrorism here because it’s flu, and I included my columns on the U.S. smallpox vaccination program because it’s vaccination.

The first section of this index is entitled “Especially Important to Read.” These aren’t necessarily introductory articles. (I don’t write enough introductory articles.) They’re the ones I consider most important. All of them are also included under narrower subject headings in the sections that follow.

The second and longest section is devoted to “The Swine Flu Pandemic of 2009–2010” – a wonderful case study of every stage in pandemic communication, all applied to a pandemic so mild it was almost a practice exercise. There’s a subsection on “Major Articles.” Then come the “Swine Flu Pandemic Communication Updates” I added to this website periodically throughout the pandemic – almost daily at the start, every few months by the end. The last two subsections are “Other Articles” and “Guestbook Entries.“

(For the handful of readers who may want to immerse themselves in the swine flu risk communication case study, I have added a section with links to everything on the website in chronological order, starting with my first two-paragraph alert on April 24, 2009. Everything else is in reverse chronological order as usual.)

The third section is on “Influenza Pandemics other than Swine Flu” – which at least so far is mostly about the bird flu pandemic that has yet to materialize. Like the swine flu section, this section has subsections on “Major Articles,” “Other Articles,” and “Guestbook Entries.” There is also a subsection – placed second – containing my “Columns from CIDRAP Business Source Weekly Briefing,” a pandemic preparedness newsletter published in 2006–2007 by the Center for Infectious Disease Research & Policy at the University of Minnesota. Most of these columns are based – sometimes very closely based – on my longer bird flu risk communication writing for this website.

The final section is a catchall, with writing on “SARS, ‘Ordinary’ Flu, and Other Infectious Diseases.” It has two subsections, one with “Articles” and the other with “Guestbook Entries.”

Topical Sections in Infectious Diseases

Especially Important to Read

  • The “Fake Pandemic” Charge Goes Mainstream and WHO’s Credibility Nosedives

    Website column by Peter M. Sandman and Jody Lanard

    Posted: June 29, 2010

    In June 2010, one year after the World Health Organization declared swine flu a full-fledged pandemic, WHO’s credibility nosedived as even mainstream sources began to take seriously the absurd allegation that WHO had invented a “fake pandemic” in order to enrich the pharmaceutical industry. This column assesses at great length the three main reasons why this allegation made the move from fringe to mainstream: (a) WHO’s failure to acknowledge the ongoing mildness and current low incidence of the pandemic; (b) WHO’s failure to acknowledge that it changed some flu pandemic definitions and descriptions just as H1N1 was emerging; and (c) WHO’s failure to acknowledge until recently the legitimacy of concerns about transparency and conflict of interest. In a nutshell, the credibility of the World Health Organization crashed and burned because WHO mishandled some essential aspects of pandemic risk communication.

  • Why did the CDC misrepresent its swine flu mortality data – innumeracy, dishonesty, or what?

    Guestbook entry and response(s)

    Posted: February 2, 2010

    Communication Professor Rob Ulmer wrote to me after reading my Swine Flu Pandemic Communication Updates for December 2 and December 15, in which I accused the CDC of misrepresenting its own data about swine flu severity, both overall and for specific age groups. Dr. Ulmer attributed the misrepresentation to innumeracy rather than dishonesty. This long Guestbook entry presents my evidence that the misrepresentation was intentional; my observations and speculations about why “good guys” so often feel entitled to mislead in a good cause; some previously unpublished CDC data about age-specific swine flu population mortality rates; and Dr. Ulmer’s continued conviction that innumeracy rather than dishonesty is probably the culprit.

  • U.S. Pandemic Vaccine Supply and Distribution: Addressing the Outrage

    Website column by Peter M. Sandman and Jody Lanard

    Posted: November 18, 2009

    As in most other developed countries, the fall rollout of the U.S. pandemic vaccination program has been hampered by a shortage of vaccine. The result is outrage – outrage that there isn’t as much vaccine as people wanted and expected, and outrage that the distribution process feels so chaotic, frustrating, and in some cases unfair. The shortage itself is nobody’s fault; the vaccine virus turned out to be difficult to grow. But officials are very much at fault for having overpromised, frequently predicting that there would be ample vaccine by mid-October. Even before the pandemic began, in fact, the meme was established that it would require only three to six months after the emergence of a pandemic influenza strain to manufacture sufficient vaccine. Managing public (and health care provider) outrage about vaccine supply and vaccine distribution has thus become an important pandemic risk communication task, a necessary distraction from the paramount task of convincing people to get vaccinated. This column describes how officials are handling the outrage so far, and proposes some improvements.

  • The meme that this pandemic is “like the seasonal flu”

    Guestbook entry and response

    Posted: October 23, 2009

    Like many public health officials around the world (and in the U.S.), officials in Italy often say the ongoing pandemic is “like the seasonal flu.” An Italian science journalist wrote to ask if I share her objections to making the pandemic sound “normal” in this way. I do – and this Guestbook response, written jointly with my wife and colleague Jody Lanard, explains why. Equating the two is technically inaccurate. For example, the pandemic virus is less dangerous than the seasonal flu to seniors, but more dangerous than the seasonal flu to younger people. And the pandemic virus is more likely than the seasonal flu viruses to mutate suddenly into a more virulent strain. Ignoring differences like these is a way of normalizing the pandemic, presumably in order to avoid frightening the public. Like over-reassurance generally, it does harm if it works (because people don’t protect themselves enough) and harm if it doesn’t work (because people learn to mistrust public health officials).

  • Swine Flu for Grownups

    Distributed by Project Syndicate, July 27, 2009

    Project Syndicate is a nonprofit organization that distributes op-ed commentaries on currently hot topics to newspapers around the world, free of charge. They asked me to do one on how public health officials ought to be communicating with the public about the ongoing H1N1 pandemic. The resulting piece briefly discusses nine mistakes officials should stop making: don’t feign confidence; don’t over-reassure; don’t worry about panic; don’t obsess over accusations of fear-mongering; don’t fight the adjustment reaction; don’t oversell what the government is doing; don’t oversell what the public can do; don’t ask the impossible; and don’t neglect the teachable moment.

  • Containment as Signal: Swine Flu Risk Miscommunication

    Website column by Peter M. Sandman and Jody Lanard

    Posted: June 29, 2009

    The swine flu pandemic started in North America, and by the time the virus was identified it was already widely seeded in the U.S. So the experts judged that it was too late to try to “contain” its U.S. spread; from Day One, the U.S. was focused mostly on coping with the disease, not stopping or even slowing it. Outside North America, on the other hand, an initial containment strategy made public health sense. But containment isn’t just a public health strategy. It is also a risk communication signal of enormous importance. Containment sends a signal that the pandemic can be contained and that it must be contained – that it is stoppable and severe. Instead of countering these misleading signals, the governments of many countries have issued misleading messages to match. This is doing significant damage to the world’s preparedness to cope with the unstoppable (and soon to be pervasive) but so far mild pandemic that is just beginning.

  • Swine flu worst case scenarios: warn people now or wait till things start getting nasty?

    Guestbook entry and response

    Posted: May 30, 2009

    This description was written when it was unclear whether swine flu was going to turn more severe or stay mild. It stayed mild, but I’ve left the blurb unchanged. Dan Rutz, a communication professional at the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, wrote to challenge my view that the CDC (and other authorities) should do more to help people imagine what a severe pandemic might be like, and to motivate people to prepare for the possibility that one might be coming. He argued that warning about worst case scenarios right now, when swine flu has turned out mild so far, is both unkind and futile. Worse, it is likely to squander credibility that will be needed if a severe pandemic does start to look imminent. I responded, and Dan annotated my response. The result is a dialogue that makes both viewpoints clear. Dan also proposed a compromise:  Include worst case scenarios as one of the uncertainties mentioned, but without undue emphasis. And “give people permission to stockpile food, etc., but don’t push it on everyone; that way, we’re respecting those who choose to be cautious, but not antagonizing those who decide to wait it out a bit longer.”

  • Is swine flu moving slowly? Did the authorities overreact? What should the key messages be now?

    Guestbook entry and response

    Posted: May 10, 2009

    A reader expressed doubts about my judgment that swine flu is spreading slowly so far, and accused me of prematurely deciding the authorities had overreacted to the outbreak. My response stresses that I agree with the reader – fervently – that swine flu may yet turn into the virulent, snowballing pandemic we all fear, and that the authorities didn’t overreact at all. If anything, I think they have underplayed the threat, and especially the need to prepare. But I argue nonetheless that so far this swine flu epidemic is mild and it is spreading slowly – facts that many people mistakenly see as evidence that the authorities overreacted. That makes it much harder to persuade people to prepare in case things get worse. Warnings about how bad swine flu could get, I conclude, won’t be credible unless they’re accompanied by acknowledgments that, so far, it’s not as bad as we initially feared … and still fear.

  • The Swine Flu Crisis: The Government Is Preparing for the Worst While Hoping for the Best – It Needs to Tell the Public to Do the Same Thing!

    Website column

    Posted: April 29, 2009

    This was my first substantial piece of writing about swine flu. I have resisted the temptation to update the description that follows. When I started criticizing the government for talking about swine flu as if there were nothing for the public to do but watch and practice good hygiene, we were at WHO Pandemic Phase 3. When I started this column (this morning) we were at Phase 4. When I finished the column (this evening), it was already Phase 5. The focus of this column is why the U.S. government is reluctant to urge the public to prepare now for a possibly imminent pandemic, and why I think the government should overcome its reluctance and do it! If you’re skeptical about advising people to imagine The Big One, get used to that knot in their stomachs, and then get started on preparedness, read this column. If you’re not skeptical and want to know what I think the important messages for right now are, skip this column and instead read “What to Say When a Pandemic Looks Imminent: Messaging for WHO Phases Four and Five..”

    On May 21, 2009, Nature published a major abridgment and minor updating of this column under the title “Pandemics: good hygiene is not enough.” An Adobe Acrobat file (707-kB pdf) of the complete article link is to a PDF:link is to a PDF file is available. (Note: The Nature links require payment. Free access to a copy is available.)

    French translations of my column and the Nature article, originally posted on the website Zone Grippe Aviaire (which has disappeared) are also available on this site.

  • What to Say When a Pandemic Looks Imminent: Messaging for WHO Phases Four and Five

    Website column by Peter M. Sandman and Jody Lanard

    Posted: March 15, 2007

    If and when a serious pandemic arrives, messaging will shift from precaution advocacy (high-hazard, low-outrage) to crisis communication (high-hazard, high-outrage). There will be a transition period between the two, when the pandemic looks imminent and outrage is rising fast. This very long column – split into four parts – identifies 25 “standby messages” for that transition period. It elaborates both the messages and their risk communication rationales. Jody Lanard and I wrote the column with two goals in mind: to help officials prepare their communications for the early days of a pandemic that looks like it might be severe, and to help them decide to be more candid (and thus more alarming) in their pre-pandemic communications now in order to make those early days less of a shock.

    A French translation of the 25 messages, originally posted on the website Zone Grippe Aviaire (which has disappeared), is now available on this site.

    French translations available

    En Français: Quoi dire lorsqu’une pandémie paraît imminente: Transmission de message pour l’OMS Phases Quatre et Cinq

    En Français: Page 2 de 4:  messages 1–12

    En Français: Page 3 de 4:  messages 13–25

  • Bird Flu, Pandemic Flu, and Poultry Markets: Playing Ostrich or Talking Turkey?

    Website column by Peter M. Sandman and Jody Lanard

    Posted: May 29, 2006

    When the next influenza pandemic finally arrives, it will be carried by people, not birds. In the meantime, the public is understandably confused about the distinction between the “bird flu” that threatens poultry flocks and the poultry industry (and an occasional unlucky person) right now and the “bird flu” that may someday mutate to facilitate human-to-human transmission and threaten us all. In this column, Jody Lanard and I try to disentangle bird flu from pandemic flu. And then we address the most common risk communication errors committed by government and industry in virtually every country beset by bird flu, when they set out to convince consumers not to worry and not to stop eating poultry.

  • The Flu Pandemic Preparedness Snowball

    Website column

    Posted: October 10, 2005

    I published this column in late 2005, when the U.S. public’s interest in pandemic preparedness was as high as it’s been so far. This was the teachable moment, I wrote. It wouldn’t last, so preparedness advocates needed to make the most of it. The column discusses nine recommendations to improve pandemic preparedness advocacy. Among the highlights: Focus less on the pharmaceutical fix; focus more on worst case scenarios, non-medical preparedness, and non-governmental preparedness; stop implying that a pandemic is imminent. Much of this advice is relevant even in periods of diminished attention, and most of it will still be on-target the next time pandemic preparedness is hot.

  • Bird Flu: Communicating the Risk link is to a PDF

    by Peter M. Sandman and Jody Lanard

    Published in Perspectives in Health (Pan American Health Organization), vol. 10, no. 2, 2005, pp. 2–9

    PAHO asked us to combine a primer on risk communication with a primer on avian influenza. The resulting article talks about the challenge of alerting the public to bird flu risks, then offers ten risk communication principles, each illustrated with bird flu examples. The PDF file also includes the cover, an editor’s note entitled “Communication: risky business,” and the contents page. (Note the confusion of “bird flu” with pandemic flu in this 2005 article – and this blurb, also written in 2005.)

    (There is an online version (same text, but easier to read than a PDF file) posted on the PAHO website. The entire issue is also there.

  • Superb Flu Pandemic Risk Communication: A Role Model from Australia

    Website column by Peter M. Sandman and Jody Lanard

    Posted: July 6, 2005

    On May 2, 2005, Australian Health Minister Tony Abbott gave a speech on pandemic preparedness. It wasn’t especially earthshaking; in fact, it attracted fairly little media attention. But Jody Lanard and I thought it was terrific – candid, alarming, tentative, all the things most official pandemic presentations were not (and are not). So we sat down to annotate the speech in terms of 25 crisis communication recommendations we had published previously. If you just read the speech, you’ll discover that good risk communication can sound just as ordinary as bad risk communication. If you read the column’s annotations, you’ll discover how extraordinary this particular speech really was.

  • Pandemic Influenza Risk Communication: The Teachable Moment

    Website column by Peter M. Sandman and Jody Lanard

    Posted: December 4, 2004

    This is the first column Jody Lanard and I wrote about pandemic preparedness. We wrote it when many experts believed a devastating H5N1 flu pandemic might be just around the corner – and so we thought so too. (We still think the risk is serious, but there’s much less sense of imminence as I write this blurb in mid-2008.) The thrust of this long column is how to sound the alarm. After a primer on why H5N1 is “not your garden variety flu,” the column proposes a list of pre-crisis pandemic talking points. Then it assesses how well experts and officials were addressing those points as of late 2004. The experts, we wrote, were doing their best to arouse the public. But governments and international agencies were undermining the sense of urgency with grossly over-optimistic claims about pharmaceutical solutions.

  • Worst Case Scenarios

    Website column

    Posted: August 28, 2004

    Most of this long column is addressed to risk communicators whose goal is to keep their audience unconcerned. So naturally they’d rather not talk about awful but unlikely worst case scenarios. The column details their reluctance even to mention worst case scenarios, and their tendency when they finally get around to discussing them to do so over-reassuringly. It explains why this is unwise – why people (especially outraged people) tend to overreact to worst case scenarios when the available information is scanty or over-reassuring. Then the column lists 25 guidelines for explaining worst case scenarios properly. Finally, a postscript addresses the opposite problem. Suppose you’re not trying to reassure people about worst case scenarios; you’re trying to warn them. How can you do that more effectively?

The Swine Flu Pandemic of 2009–2010

Major Articles
(The Swine Flu Pandemic of 2009–2010)

  • The “Fake Pandemic” Charge Goes Mainstream and WHO’s Credibility Nosedives

    Website column by Peter M. Sandman and Jody Lanard

    Posted: June 29, 2010

    In June 2010, one year after the World Health Organization declared swine flu a full-fledged pandemic, WHO’s credibility nosedived as even mainstream sources began to take seriously the absurd allegation that WHO had invented a “fake pandemic” in order to enrich the pharmaceutical industry. This column assesses at great length the three main reasons why this allegation made the move from fringe to mainstream: (a) WHO’s failure to acknowledge the ongoing mildness and current low incidence of the pandemic; (b) WHO’s failure to acknowledge that it changed some flu pandemic definitions and descriptions just as H1N1 was emerging; and (c) WHO’s failure to acknowledge until recently the legitimacy of concerns about transparency and conflict of interest. In a nutshell, the credibility of the World Health Organization crashed and burned because WHO mishandled some essential aspects of pandemic risk communication.

  • Swine Flu Pandemic Communication Challenges and Lessons Learned

    by Peter M. Sandman and Jody Lanard

    Posted: May 5, 2010

    Responses to emailed questions from Lisa Schnirring of CIDRAP News

    On April 21, 2010, Lisa Schnirring of CIDRAP News (part of the Center for Infectious Disease Research & Policy at the University of Minnesota) wrote me that she was working on an article on communications challenges and lessons learned from the swine flu pandemic – one of a series of CIDRAP News retrospectives to mark the first anniversary of the emergence of the new H1N1 virus. Would my wife and colleague Jody Lanard and I like to be interviewed? I replied that if she would email us some questions, we would answer in writing. No article ever materialized, but here are Lisa’s questions and our answers.

  • European hearing airs WHO pandemic response, critics’ charges

    by Lisa Schnirring

    Posted on the website of CIDRAP News (Center for Infectious Disease Research & Policy, University of Minnesota), January 26, 2010

    Charges that the World Health Organization (WHO) exaggerated the risk of the H1N1 pandemic in collusion with drug companies came to a head in a January 26 hearing of the Council of Europe’s Committee on Social, Health and Family Affairs. Lisa Schnirring covered the story for CIDRAP News. While she was working on her article, I sent her an email offering some comments. My wife and colleague Jody Lanard did so as well (at Lisa’s request), and Lisa wound up quoting us both – Jody mostly on the normal antipathy between WHO and Big Pharma and thus the irony of the conflict-of-interest charge; and me mostly on WHO’s failure to concede two valid charges among the invalid ones: that WHO hadn’t sufficiently acknowledged the pandemic’s mildness and that WHO had dropped severity from its characterization of flu pandemics at the last minute.

    After Lisa’s article was published, Jody and I decided to expand my email to document more thoroughly the two valid charges, the risk communication case for acknowledging them, and WHO’s failure to do so. The resulting critique (“It’s Not a Fake Pandemic – but WHO’s Defense Lacks Candor”) is a lot tougher on WHO than the CIDRAP News article.

  • The CDC’s Pandemic Data versus the CDC’s Pandemic Communications: Outtakes from a Media Interview
    (Note: This link goes to a page on-site with links to a number of MP3 audio files.)

    by Peter M. Sandman

    Posted: December 18, 2009

    On December 2, 2009, and again on December 15, I criticized the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention in my “Swine Flu Pandemic Communication Update” for (in my view) intentionally misinterpreting its own data on the severity of the swine flu pandemic and on which age cohorts were most at risk. These criticisms aroused surprisingly little media interest. But a couple of reporters did call for interviews. Here are some excerpts from my side of one telephone interview.

  • U.S. Pandemic Vaccine Supply and Distribution: Addressing the Outrage

    Website column by Peter M. Sandman and Jody Lanard

    Posted: November 18, 2009

    As in most other developed countries, the fall rollout of the U.S. pandemic vaccination program has been hampered by a shortage of vaccine. The result is outrage – outrage that there isn’t as much vaccine as people wanted and expected, and outrage that the distribution process feels so chaotic, frustrating, and in some cases unfair. The shortage itself is nobody’s fault; the vaccine virus turned out to be difficult to grow. But officials are very much at fault for having overpromised, frequently predicting that there would be ample vaccine by mid-October. Even before the pandemic began, in fact, the meme was established that it would require only three to six months after the emergence of a pandemic influenza strain to manufacture sufficient vaccine. Managing public (and health care provider) outrage about vaccine supply and vaccine distribution has thus become an important pandemic risk communication task, a necessary distraction from the paramount task of convincing people to get vaccinated. This column describes how officials are handling the outrage so far, and proposes some improvements.

  • Sorting through panic and anxiety

    by Judy Gerstel

    Published in the Toronto Star, October 30, 2009

    When a healthy 13-year-old soccer player in Toronto suddenly got swine flu and died, both major Toronto newspapers ran front-page stories urging people not to panic. Until then, public health authorities had been desperately trying to get people to take the pandemic seriously enough; now they reversed direction and started making reassuring statements. Instead of seizing the teachable moment, they succumbed to their own “fear of fear.” Judy Gerstel of the Toronto Star called me to ask about the mixed messages. The resulting story suffers a bit from ham-handed editing – but it is still on target.

  • Flu Preparedness: An Even Tougher Sell than Usual

    Website column

    Posted: September 9, 2009

    I wrote this short column in early June 2009 for The Synergist, a magazine for industrial hygienists, on some ways of communicating about flu – seasonal and pandemic – in the workplace. When I wrote it, most people had “recovered” from what they considered the spring “swine flu scare,” and they were in no mood to listen to any more influenza warnings. By the time the column was published in September 2009, some of the complacency had waned, and people were actually girding up (a bit) for another wave of mild-but-pervasive pandemic illness. So the column’s claim that flu preparedness is a tough sell needs to be modified somewhat. But its actual recommendations still stand.

  • Swine Flu for Grownups

    Distributed by Project Syndicate, July 27, 2009

    Project Syndicate is a nonprofit organization that distributes op-ed commentaries on currently hot topics to newspapers around the world, free of charge. They asked me to do one on how public health officials ought to be communicating with the public about the ongoing H1N1 pandemic. The resulting piece briefly discusses nine mistakes officials should stop making: don’t feign confidence; don’t over-reassure; don’t worry about panic; don’t obsess over accusations of fear-mongering; don’t fight the adjustment reaction; don’t oversell what the government is doing; don’t oversell what the public can do; don’t ask the impossible; and don’t neglect the teachable moment.

  • Containment as Signal: Swine Flu Risk Miscommunication

    Website column by Peter M. Sandman and Jody Lanard

    Posted: June 29, 2009

    The swine flu pandemic started in North America, and by the time the virus was identified it was already widely seeded in the U.S. So the experts judged that it was too late to try to “contain” its U.S. spread; from Day One, the U.S. was focused mostly on coping with the disease, not stopping or even slowing it. Outside North America, on the other hand, an initial containment strategy made public health sense. But containment isn’t just a public health strategy. It is also a risk communication signal of enormous importance. Containment sends a signal that the pandemic can be contained and that it must be contained – that it is stoppable and severe. Instead of countering these misleading signals, the governments of many countries have issued misleading messages to match. This is doing significant damage to the world’s preparedness to cope with the unstoppable (and soon to be pervasive) but so far mild pandemic that is just beginning.

  • Communication expert endorses WHO’s delay on pandemic declaration

    by Robert Roos

    Posted on the website of CIDRAP News (Center for Infectious Disease Research & Policy, University of Minnesota), June 12, 2009

    On June 11, the World Health Organization finally let the other shoe drop, formally declaring H1N1 a pandemic. CIDRAP’s Robert Roos sent me an email asking for my comments. I responded that the delay itself had been pretty sensible – which turned into Bob’s lead angle. But I had mixed feelings about some of what Director-General Margaret Chan and Interim Assistant Director-General Keiji Fukuda said in making the announcement. What had motivated WHO to delay in the first place had been its twin concerns that the declaration might frighten people unduly (“Oh my God a pandemic!”) and that the declaration might reinforce people’s complacency (“This is a pandemic? What’s the big deal?”). Yet the announcement did relatively little to address either concern. My original exchange of emails with Bob Roos (“Reactions to the WHO’s Phase 6 Declaration”) is posted on this site.

  • Avoiding “warning fatigue” over swine flu

    by Anita Makri

    Posted on Emerging Health Threats Forum, May 8, 2009

    Anita Makri of Emerging Health Threats Forum asked some of the most thoughtful questions I have been asked anywhere about the risk communication implications of the fact that swine flu has been mild so far, about what governments might have done differently in the way they warned people, about what they ought to be saying now, and about how to handle any future warnings that might be needed. She compiled my answers with answers from the CDC’s Barbara Reynolds into an excellent article on swine flu warning fatigue. This sentence from the article captures the problem best: “‘We need to persuade people who became alarmed (wisely) and then became less alarmed (also wisely) that they have nothing to feel foolish about and nothing to feel angry about … but good reason to remain vigilant,’ says Sandman.”

  • Communicating the Message of Swine Flu: An Expert’s Opinion
    (Note: This link goes to a webpage off-site with the link to this MP3 audio file.)

    by Grace Hood

    Broadcast on KUNC radio, May 5, 2009

    Grace Hood made a mistake at the start of this four-minute interview when she said I told her some people are panicking about swine flu. And I overstated things pretty badly myself when I said that at the start of the outbreak the experts were “on the phone in the middle of the night” worrying that swine flu might be “the granddaddy of all pandemics.” Despite both errors, this is a pretty solid interview on two key points I keep stressing: (a) that a good pandemic warning needs to be simultaneously scary and tentative; and (b) that the U.S. government didn’t do much to urge people to prepare when it looked like a severe pandemic might be imminent, so it’s hard to imagine it’ll do more now that the sense of imminence has gone.

  • What’s in a name: H1N1 versus swine flu

    Expanded Guestbook response by Peter M. Sandman and Jody Lanard

    Posted: May 3, 2009

    One inevitable effect of the swine flu crisis that began in late April 2009 was public concern about eating pork products. In an effort to reassure people, international authorities decided that “swine flu” would henceforth be known instead as “A/H1N1.” An international financial manager wrote to the website Guestbook in support of the switch. Jody and I disagreed, arguing (a) that the new virus is in fact a swine flu, and it’s a mistake to pretend otherwise; (b) that there is already a seasonal A/H1N1, and it’s a mistake to give two circulating viruses the same name; and (c) that risk communication offers some better ways than linguistic cover-up to cope with the stigmatization of pork. Our answer grew too long for the Guestbook, so here it is. (We had to revise the half-written answer when Canada discovered human-to-pig transmission of the new virus. Other developments may strengthen our argument, as that one did – or, perhaps, weaken it.)

  • The Swine Flu Crisis: The Government Is Preparing for the Worst While Hoping for the Best – It Needs to Tell the Public to Do the Same Thing!

    Website column

    Posted: April 29, 2009

    This was my first substantial piece of writing about swine flu. I have resisted the temptation to update the description that follows. When I started criticizing the government for talking about swine flu as if there were nothing for the public to do but watch and practice good hygiene, we were at WHO Pandemic Phase 3. When I started this column (this morning) we were at Phase 4. When I finished the column (this evening), it was already Phase 5. The focus of this column is why the U.S. government is reluctant to urge the public to prepare now for a possibly imminent pandemic, and why I think the government should overcome its reluctance and do it! If you’re skeptical about advising people to imagine The Big One, get used to that knot in their stomachs, and then get started on preparedness, read this column. If you’re not skeptical and want to know what I think the important messages for right now are, skip this column and instead read “What to Say When a Pandemic Looks Imminent: Messaging for WHO Phases Four and Five..”

    On May 21, 2009, Nature published a major abridgment and minor updating of this column under the title “Pandemics: good hygiene is not enough.” An Adobe Acrobat file (707-kB pdf) of the complete article link is to a PDF:link is to a PDF file is available. (Note: The Nature links require payment. Free access to a copy is available.)

    French translations of my column and the Nature article, originally posted on the website Zone Grippe Aviaire (which has disappeared) are also available on this site.

Swine Flu Pandemic Communication Updates
(The Swine Flu Pandemic of 2009–2010)

On April 24, 2009, when a swine flu pandemic looked imminent and potentially very serious, I posted a two-paragraph alert on my website home page. This was the first of several dozen “Swine Flu Pandemic Communication Updates” I posted on the site. They soon got much, much longer and moved off the home page. They were no longer “alerts,” really, but rather essays on how the swine flu pandemic was evolving, how it was being communicated, and how I thought it should be communicated.

June 29, 2010
The “Fake Pandemic” Charge Goes Mainstream and WHO’s Credibility Nosedives
January 17, 2010
Pandemic Interruptus: It Ain’t Over Till It’s Over
December 15, 2009
What the CDC Is Saying about Swine Flu Severity
December 15, 2009
Update on the December 2 Update
December 2, 2009
It’s Official (sort of): The Swine Flu Pandemic Is Mild So Far
November 18, 2009
U.S. Pandemic Vaccine Supply and Distribution: Addressing the Outrage
September 26, 2009
Overselling Seasonal Flu Vaccination in a Pandemic Season
August 21, 2009
Talking about Pandemic H1N1 Vaccination
July 21, 2009
The Three-Legged Stool of Pandemic MessagingEn Français: Le tabouret à trois pattes de transmission de messages pour la pandémie
July 7, 2009
Why Pandemic Complacency Isn’t OkayEn Français: Pourquoi en cas de pandémie l’insouciance n’est-elle pas acceptable?
June 17, 2009
Would you like another wakeup call? En Français: Souhaiteriez-vous un autre appel de réveil?
June 4, 2009
Swine Flu Pandemic Prospects: Nobody Knows
May 23, 2009
Swine Flu Pandemic Prospects: Nobody Knows
May 16, 2009
Swine Flu Pandemic Prospects: Nobody Knows
May 6, 2009
Swine Flu Pandemic Prospects: Nobody Knows
April 29, 2009
Swine Flu Pandemic Scare Gets Serious
April 28, 2009
Swine Flu Pandemic Scare Gets Serious
April 26, 2009
Swine Flu Pandemic Scare Gets Serious
April 24, 2009
Swine Flu Pandemic Scare Gets Serious

Other Articles
(The Swine Flu Pandemic of 2009–2010)

Guestbook Entries
(The Swine Flu Pandemic of 2009–2010)

Everything in Chronological Order
(The Swine Flu Pandemic of 2009–2010)

Influenza Pandemics other than Swine Flu

Major Articles
(Influenza Pandemics other than Swine Flu)

Columns from CIDRAP Business Source Weekly Briefing
(Influenza Pandemics other than Swine Flu)

CIDRAP logo

Other Articles
(Influenza Pandemics other than Swine Flu)

Guestbook Entries
(Influenza Pandemics other than Swine Flu)

SARS, “Ordinary” Flu,
and Other Infectious Diseases

Articles
(SARS, “Ordinary” Flu, and Other Infectious Diseases)

Guestbook Entries
(SARS, “Ordinary” Flu, and Other Infectious Diseases)

Contact Information:  Peter M. Sandman

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Email:  peter@psandman.com
Phone: 1-609-683-4073
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